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Ross v. Bernhard: The Uncertain
Future of the Seventh Amendment*
In Ross v. Bernhard1 the Supreme Court decided that the right to
a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment2 extends "to those issues
in [stockholder] derivative actions as to which the corporation, if it
had been suing in its own right, would have been entitled to a jury.
' '8
The decision repudiated the traditional doctrine that shareholders
have no right to a jury trial in derivative actions, 4 regardless of the
character of the underlying claim for relief.
Although the express holding of the case affects only stockholder
derivative actions,5 the reasoning of the opinion has vast implications
for the scope of the jury right under the Seventh Amendment. A lead-
ing commentator has expressed the fear that the theory and reasoning
of Ross might so expand the right to jury trial as to include within it
all "legal" issues in actions formerly within equity's concurrent juris.
diction.6 This Note will explore the potential reach of the Ross opinion
* The author expresses his thanks to Professor J. W. Moore of Yale Law School for
suggesting this topic.
1. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
2. "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be other.
wise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law." U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
3. 396 U.S. 531, 532-33 (1970).
4. See pp. 115-16 infra.
5. As a result of Ross, stockholders and their counsel, in the conviction that juries
are more sympathetic to plaintiffs than are judges, may bring an increased number of
derivative suits. This will not necessarily lead to more trials since defendants may also
be quite sensitive to the biases of juries and therefore more disposed to settle before
trial. Since Ross there has not been any apparent increase in the number of derivative
suits going to trial.
The express holding in Ross may also have an impact on the question of a director's
liability for mere negligence. One commentator has concluded that "the cases in which
a director is adjudged liable, or compelled to settle, a derivative suit based on nothing
worse than ordinary negligence do not amount to one in a hundred." Bishop, Sitting
Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and
Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1101 (1968). Courts have offered a variety of ,reasons for
refusing to hold directors liable for mere negligence. See Dyson, The Dlrectors Liability
for Negligence, 40 IND. L.J. 341 (1965). Some courts have simply construed the facts very
leniently in cases where directors are alleged to have violated the duty of care. Id. at
373-75. Now that a jury is available in stockholder derivative actions, this area of
corporate law may grow substantially, since many ultimately successful stockholder suits
may be induced by the expectation of plaintiffs that juries will find directors liable for
mere negligence where judges would have found no liability.
6. J. MooRE, FxaERAL PRAarIcE RuLEs PAMPHLET 810-11 (1971). See note 46 infra.
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and suggest a different, less rigid means for dealing with the issue of
jury trials in civil actions.
The Seventh Amendment provides in part that "in Suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved ... ."7 Prior to Ross this
language was interpreted to mean that the jury trial right was pre-
served as it existed at common laws in England in 1791,10 the year
the amendment was adopted. Since the amendment speaks only of
suits at common law, it was construed before Ross to have no appli-
cation to suits in equity.1 Under the English practice prevailing in
1791, common law actions, with a few exceptions, 12 were tried to a
jury and suits in equity were tried to the court unless the chancellor
in his discretion impaneled an advisory jury.13 Hence prior to Ross
the Seventh Amendment was interpreted as adopting the English
practice and so preserving the right of jury trial only in common law
actions in which such a right existed in 1791.
As for rights and remedies created since 1791, the traditional case
law indicated that "the right of action should be analogized to its
historical counterpart, at law or in equity, for the purpose of determin-
ing whether there is a right of jury trial," unless Congress had expressly
prescribed the mode of trial.14 Thus under this view trial by jury
would exist as of right only if the proper analogue of a newly created
cause of action were a common law action for which jury trial was
provided in 1791.
7. U.S. CONsr. amend. VII. Thus the amendment does not create tle jury right. 5
J. MoorEz, FEDRnAL PRAcricE 38.08, at 85 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Mooa's
FEDERAL PRACTICE].
8. Paysons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830).
9. Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 377-78 (1913); United States v.
Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (No. 16,750) (C.C.D. Mass. 1812).
10. Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 US. 654, 657 (1935); Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 337 (1965); 5 Mooa. s FEDEMAL
PRACTICE 38.08[5], at 79.
11. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 447 (1944); Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253, 262 (1855). Nor has the
amendment been treated as applying to suits in admiralty, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 45 (1932), or to administrative proceedings, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
12. Examples of such exceptions were suits against the sovereign, contempt and habeas
corpus proceedings, and condemnation actions invoking the power of eminent domain.
5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.08[5], at 86.
13. F. JAMrs, supra note 10, at 338.
14. Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27-28 (1913); 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PAcntc
tj 38.11[7], at 128.4; F. JA.ts, supra note 10, at 339. See also Note, The Right to a Jury
Trial in a Stockholder's Derivative Action, 74 YALE L.J. 725, 727 n.14 (1965).
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Prior to 1938, federal civil courts had a law side and an equity side,
each with its own distinct procedures. 15 Causes of action analogous
to English common law actions were brought on the law side. Since
those common law actions for which jury trial was not provided in
1791 were few, jury trial was generally available on this side of the
court. Actions analogous to English equity actions were brought on
the equity side of the civil courts, and jury trial was not provided.1 0
But with the union of law and equity in 1938, the equity and law
sides of the court were merged into a single civil jurisdiction with
uniform rules of procedure.1r Pursuant to these rules legal and
equitable claims, formerly brought as separate causes of action on the
law side and the equity side, respectively, could properly be joined
in a single civil action.'
This feature of merger made the Seventh Amendment historical
test extremely difficult to apply when, under the broad provisions of
the Federal Rules for joinder of claims,'9 equitable and legal remedies
were sought alternatively or cumulatively; or when, under the Rules'
provisions for compulsory and permissive counterclaims, 0 legal coun-
terclaims were made to equitable claims or equitable counterclaims
to legal claims.21 In such situations, "issues formerly equitable are
for the court; issues formerly legal are normally for the jury if timely
demand is made.'122 The sequence in which these issues are tried,
however, has great importance. For if the equitable and legal issues
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, adjudicating the
equitable issues first may operate through collateral estoppel to pre-
15. 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAMICE f 38 .03, at 24.
16. Id., 39.07, at 712-13.
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 2.
18. Prior to the Federal Rules equitable and legal claims could appear in the same
action, but only to a very limited extent. The Law and Equity Act of 1915, Act of
March 3, 1915, ch. 90, & 274(b), 38 Stat. 956, permitted equitable defenses or counter
claims to be interposed in an action at law, but it did not provide for the interposition
of legal counterclaims in equity suits nor for the joinder of legal and equitable causes
of action. See 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcicE 38.13, at 143-44. Under Federal Rule 13,
legal counterclaims can now be interposed in actions which prior to merger would have
been suits in equity, and if the counterclaim arises out of the same transaction as the
original cause of action it may be considered a compulsory counterclaim and its inter.
position required. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). Rule 18 permits a party to join as many claims,
"legal, equitable, or maritime," as he has against the defendant. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a),
Though the rule is permissive, and failure to join a claim does not bar its assertion in
another action, if the second claim is really a part of the first cause of action the rule
against splitting a single cause of action will prohibit suit on the second claim. 3A
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACCE 18.04[l], at 1852.
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 18.
20. FED. R. Cv. P. 13.
21. 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 38.11[l], at 112; F. JAMES, supra note 10, at 348.49.
22. 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTicE 38.15, at 152.
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vent a jury trial of the legal issues. The solution endorsed by the
Supreme Court is that in such situations the legal issues must be tried
first, even if they are merely incidental to the equitable issues. -3
II.
In most respects Ross was a typical stockholder derivative suit. The
plaintiffs, stockholders in a closed-end investment company, brought
suit on behalf of the corporation against its directors and investment
brokers claiming damages for injury sustained due to the payment of
allegedly excessive brokerage commissions.24 But Ross was atypical
in that plaintiffs demanded a trial by july.2  Had the Supreme Court
been willing to apply standard Seventh Amendment doctrine, it pre-
sumably would have held that plaintiffs had no right to a jury trial.
Although the stockholder derivative suit did not exist in England in
1791 either at common law or in equity, equitable analogues to it
existed at that time.2 6 Moreover, when the action came into being in
England and the United States in the nineteenth century, it emerged
23. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 US. 500 (1959); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood.
369 U.S. 469 (1962).
24. Plaintiffs were stockholders of Lehman Corporation. They alleged that Lehman
Brothers controlled the corporation through an illegally large representation on its
board of directors, in violation of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 US.C. §§ 80
(a)(1) - (b)(21) (1970). The plaintiffs further alleged that the corporation, under the con-
trol of Lehman Brothers, had paid excessive brokerage commissions to Lehman Brothers,
and that the payments of these fees constituted a conversion of the corporation's assets
as well as a "gross abuse of trust, gross misconduct, willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross
negligence." Finally it was charged that both the individual defendants and Lehman
Brothers had breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation and that the payments
of the brokerage commissions amounted to a waste and spoliation of the corporation's
assets. Plaintiffs prayed for a judgment requiring the defendants "to account for and
pay to the corporation for their profits and gains and its losses." Brief for Petitioners at
A25-A27, Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
25. Brief for Petitioners at A20, Ross v. Bernhard, 396 US. 531 (1970). Defendants'
motion to strike this demand was denied. The district court cited DePinto v. Provident
Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1963) cert. denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964). for
the proposition that "although the aid of equity is needed in order to establish the
stockholders' right to sue on behalf of the corporation, the claim is that of the cor-
poration and the right to a jury trial is to be judged as though the corporation were
suing." Ross v. Bernhard, 275 F. Supp. 569, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Finding that there were
"'substantial grounds for difference of opinion" as to the jury question, and that "an
immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation,"
the district court permitted an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1970). Ross v. Bernhard 65 Civ. 665 (S.D.N.Y., Dec. 6, 1967), cited in Brief for Petitioners
at A51, Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). The court of appeals reversed, holding
that a stockholder derivative suit "has always been treated as one, unitary action brought
at equity" and that therefore the Seventh Amendment does not extend the jury right
to it. Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909, 914 (2d Cir. 1968). The court specifically disagreed
with DePinto. Id. at 911. Because of this disagreement among the circuits, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 394 U.S. 917 (1969).
26. Prunty, The Shareholder's Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 980-85 (1957).
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as a wholly equitable action.2 7 From its inception until Ross, the
stockholder derivative suit had always been viewed, with one excep.
tion,2 8 as a single cause of action in equity29 excluded from the pur-
view of the Seventh Amendment's jury trial guarantee.3 0
Instead of applying the traditional historical test to the stockholder
derivative suit and denying the jury trial request, the Supreme Court
in Ross held that there was a right to trial by jury. Whereas prior
courts had seen the derivative suit as a single cause of action in equity,
the Court refused to view the suit as a unitary action. Rather, stressing
the dual nature of the action-"first, the plaintiff's right to sue on
behalf of the corporation and, second, the merits of the corporation's
claim itself" 1-it treated the derivative suit as involving the presen-
tation of two separable claims. While conceding that plaintiff's claim
to standing was "historically an equitable matter,"32 the Court stated
that the underlying corporate claim could be legal or equitable. If
equitable, no Seventh Amendment problem is presented and no jury
right exists; 33 but if legal, then the Court deemed relevant the teach-
ing of the landmark cases Beacon Theatres v. Westover3 4 and Dairy
27. Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in a Stockholder's Derivative Action, 74 YAut
L.J. 725, 729-32 (1965).
28. DePinto v. Provident Security Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 19631, cerl.
denied, 376 U.S. 950 (1964). For an excellent critique of DePinto see Note, The Right to
a Jury Trial in a Stockholder's Derivative Action, 74 YALE L.J. 725 (1965).
29. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949); Dodge V.
Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 341 (1855); Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909, 912 (2d Cir.
1968); Richland v. Crandall, 259 F. Supp. 274, 279 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Liken v. Shaffer,
64 F. Supp. 432, 441 (N.D. Iowa 1946).
30. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 544 & n.4, 546 (1970) (Stewart, J,, dis.
senting); Ross v. Bernhard, 403 F.2d 909, 912 (2d Cir. 1968); Ricbland v. Crandall, 259
F. Supp. 274, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Miller v. Welant, 42 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Ohio 1942).
In states where the civil jury right is preserved by a constitutional provision similar to the
Seventh Amendment, the majority of cases view the derivative suit as wholly equitable
and therefore not within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. See Note, The Right
to a Jury Trial in a Stockholder's Derivative Action, 74 YALE L.J. 725, 732 & n.35.
31. 396 U.S. at 534-35.
32. Id. at 538.
33. Id. at 535.
34. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). In Beacon plaintiff sought declaratory relief and an injunction
prohibiting defendant from suing for treble damages under the antitrust laws pending
the outcome of the declaratory judgment litigation. Defendant asserted a compulsory
counterclaim and a cross-claim, raising the issues which would have been raised in the
antitrust suit for treble damages, and demanded a jury trial. The district court viewed
the complaint for declaratory relief as essentially equitable, and, purporting to exercise
its discretion under FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) and 57, decided to try to the court the antitrust
allegations common to the complaint, compulsory counterclaim, and cross.claim. De.
fendant, alleging deprivation of its jury right, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the
district court to allow jury trial of all common issues. The court of appeals refused the
writ, 252 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1958), and the Supreme Court reversed, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
On the grounds that the defendant would have been entitled to a jury trial in a
treble damage suit against plaintiff, and that the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
2201-02 (1970). specifically preserves the right to jury trial for both parties, the Court
held that defendant could not be deprived of that right merely because plaintiff used
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Queen, Inc. v. Wood.3 5 The Court appropriately cited these cases,
both of which involved the presentation of historically separable legal
and equitable claims in the same action, for the proposition that
where equitable and legal claims are joined in the same action,
there is a right to jury trial on the legal claims which must not
be infringed either by trying the legal issues as incidental to the
equitable ones or by a court trial of a common issue existing
between the claims. 30
The application of this proposition to the derivative suit viewed as
an action involving two separable claims led the Court to the con-
clusion that when the underlying claim in a derivative action is legal,
"the right to a jury is not forfeited merely because the stockholder's
right to sue must first be adjudicated as an equitable issue triable to
the court."3
7
Thus the right of the shareholders in Ross to have a jury trial in
their derivative action was determined not by the character of their
claim -of standing, which was clearly equitable, but by the "nature
of the issue" in the underlying corporate claim.38 If that claim involved
"legal" issues, a jury right would exist. In determining whether a
the declaratory relief procedure to sue defendant first. 359 US. at 504. Moreover, the Court
held that even assuming that the complaint did present grounds for equitable relief, it
would be error, unless there was the danger of irreparable injury or the lack of an
adequate legal remedy, to try the common issues first to the court, since jury trial of
these issues would possibly be precluded by collateral estoppel. Id. at 503.
35. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). The owners of the trademark "Dairy Queen" sued a trademark
licensee for breach of the licensing contract. Plaintiff sought (a) temporary and per-
manent injunctions to restrain defendant from any use of or dealing in the franchise
and trademark, (b) an accounting to determine the exact amount of money owing by
defendant and a judgment for that amount, and (c) an injunction pending accounting
to prevent defendant from collecting any money from franchised stores. Defendant denied
breach of contract, pleaded laches and estoppel, and alleged violations of the antitrust
laws by plaintiffs in connection with their dealings with the trademark. In addition,
defendant demanded a jury trial. Plaintiff moved to strike this demand and the district
court granted the motion on the alternative grounds that either the action was "purely
equitable," or that if legal issues were raised they were merely "incidental" to the
equitable issues. McCullough v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 194 F. Supp. 86, 687-88 (E.D. Pa.
1961).
In either case no right to a jury existed. Defendant sought mandamus in the court
of appeals to compel the district judge to vacate this order. The court of appeals denied
this request without opinion, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari, 368 U.S. 874
(1961). The Court held that insofar as the complaint requested a money judgment it
presented a claim which was "unquestionably legal," Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369
U.S. 469, 476 (1962), and that since the factual issues presented by this legal claim "are
common with those upon which [plaintiff's] claim to equitable relief is based, the legal
claims involved in the action must be determined prior to any final court determination
of [plaintiff's] equitable claims." Id. at 479.
36. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1970).
37. Id. at 539.
38. "The Seventh Amendment question depends on the nature of the issue to be
tried rather than the character of the overall action." Id. at 538.
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particular claim is legal or equitable in nature, the Court indicated
in a footnote that it would consider:
[F]irst, the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions;
second, the remedy sought; and, third, the practical abilities and
limitations of juries.89
The Court determined that the underlying corporate claim in Ross
was "at least in part, a legal one." While never explicitly applying its
tripartite test in making this determination, the Court emphasized
that the claim was for money damages and involved allegations of
breach of contract and gross negligence.
40
Other commentators have rightly pointed out that the Court has
ignored history and precedent by treating the derivative action as
involving separable claims. 41 This criticism will not be rehearsed here.
For purposes of this Note it is enough to recognize that in Ross the
Court extracted the legal issues from a formerly unitary equitable
action and required that they be tried to a jury upon demand. This
was not done in either Beacon or Dairy Queen. Thus Ross represents
a departure from precedent and a possibly substantial extension of
the Seventh Amendment jury right.
III.
To gauge the potential scope of this extension it is necessary to
analyze the Court's reason for disregarding the equitable nature of
the shareholders' standing claim when seeking to determine whether
the shareholders had a right to a jury trial of the underlying corporate
claim. The reason offered was the merger of law and equity in 1938.
From the passage of the Seventh Amendment until merger, no remedy
at law existed for stockholders seeking to enforce a claim of their
corporation, for stockholders were without standing to assert corporate
claims on the law side of the court.42 Hence such a suit had to be
brought on the equity side, where jury trials were not provided as
of right.43 But with merger, the Court held in Ross,
39. Id. at 538 n.10.
40. Id. at 542-43. For a full discussion of this test, see pp. 126-.33 infra.
41. The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1, 174-76 (1970); Note, Jury
Trial in a Stockholders' Derivative Suit, 65 Nw.U.L. REv. 697, 700.07 (1970).
42. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1970).
43. See p. 113 supra.
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[p]urely procedural impediments to the presentation of any issue
by any party, based on the difference between law and equity,
were destroyed .... The historical rule preventing a court of law
from entertaining a shareholder's suit on behalf of the corporation
is obsolete; it is no longer tenable for a district court, administer-
ing both law and equity in the same action, to deny legal remedies
to a corporation, merely because the corporation's spokesmen are
its shareholders rather than its directors.... [N]othing turns now
upon the form of the action or the procedural devices by which
the parties happen to come before the court. 4
... After adoption of the rules there is no longer any procedur-
al obstacle to the assertion of legal rights before juries, however
the party may have acquired standing to assert those rights4 5
Under this reasoning, which will be termed the "procedural impedi-
ments" argument, no procedural obstacle now exists to the assertion
of legal rights before juries. That is, legal rights which were tried
without a jury in equity because of a procedural obstacle to their
presentation at law must now be tried to a jury upon demand. In
Ross the Court characterized law's refusal to recognize a stockholder's
standing to sue derivatively as a procedural impediment to the asser-
tion of legal rights before a jury. Since merger destroyed such ob-
stacles and since petitioners had demanded a jury trial, the Court
required that the underlying legal rights be tried to a jury.
Although the Court may have been unaware of the implications of
its decision, it seems plain that the procedural impediments argument
would result in the extension of the Seventh Amendment jury right to
vast portions of the former equity practice. For the bulk of equity's
jurisdiction was concurrent, covering "all cases of legal rights, where,
under the circumstances, there was not a plain, adequate, and com-
plete remedy at law."40 The rights which formed the basis of the
request for relief were recognized as "legal" rights usually adjudicated
44. 596 U.S. at 539-40 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 542 (emphasis added).
46. 1 J. STORY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE 117 (14th cd. 1918) (emphasis added). Among
the actions falling within this broad category were suits to compel specific performance
of a contract, suits for cancellation of a contract, and suits to enjoin tortious action. All
of these actions, which are common today, can and usually do involve so.called "legal"
issues. For example, in a damage action for breach of -x- contract, the issues of whether
a contract exists, what its terms are, and whether it has been breached are tried to the
jury, assuming one has been demanded. These issues in this context are "legal." But in
a suit to compel specific performance of 'x" contract or in a suit for cancellation, these
very same issues would have been, prior to Ross, tried to the court. Similarly, in a tort
action at law for damages, the issue of tortious action vel non is tried to the jury. But in
a suit to enjoin tortious action, this same issue was, before Ross, tried to the court.
119
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on the law side of the court, but because the remedy at law was
inadequate, the claim had to be brought on the equity side where no
jury trial was provided. The remedy at law was recognized as inade-
quate in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction because a particular
remedy was sought which the court, when sitting at law, had histori-
cally refused to grant.4 7 Such remedies were dispensed exclusively by
the equity side of the court. Thus law's refusal to grant these "equi-
table" remedies was an obstacle to the assertion of legal rights before
juries. But it was an obstacle removed by merger, for as the Court
stated in Ross:
[a]ctions are no longer brought as actions at law or suits in equity.
Under the Rules there is only one action-a "civil action"-in
which all claims may be joined and all remedies are available. 48
Since merger created a single civil court with the power to grant all
remedies formerly available on either side of the court, it nullified
law's traditional refusal to grant equitable remedies for legal rights.
Once this historical restraint was removed, it could no longer be an
obstacle to the assertion of legal rights before juries. Hence the
Court's command in Ross that legal rights must now be tried to a
jury, if prior to merger procedural impediments on the law side
47. Story viewed the concurrent jurisdiction of equity as having its origin in two
sources.
[E]ither the Courts of Law, although they have general jurisdiction in the matter,
cannot give adequate, specific, and perfect relief; or under the actual circumstances
of the case they cannot give any relief at all. The former occurs in all cases when
a simple judgment for the plaintiff or for the defendant does not meet the full
merits and exigencies of the case; but a variety of adjustments, limitations, and cross
claims are to be introduced and finally acted on; and a decree meeting all the
circumstances of the particular case between the very parties is indispensable to
complete 'distributive justice. The latter occurs when the object sought is incapable
of being accoinplished by the Courts of Law; as for instance a perpetual Injunction,
or a preventive process to restrain trespasses, nuisances, or waste. Id. at 117.
The impact of the procedural impediments argurent upon that portion of the concur
rent jurisdiction where the remedy requested was beyond the power of the law courts
is discussed in the text of this Note. For the impact of the procedural impediments
argument on those situations where law had the power to grant the remedy requested
but could not grant complete relief, see note 49 infra.
48. 596 U.S. at 539 (emphasis added). It might be argued that by focusing on "pro.
cedural impediments," the Court was limiting its extension of the jury right to those
formerly equitable cases where only standing was uniquely available in equity courts.
Such a reading might contend that while remedy is "substantive," standing Is "proce.
dural," hence the reach of Ross is more limited than the text above suggests. But if
law's refusal to grant equitable remedies is "substantive," an anomaly results, since
merger, which nullified this refusal, was specifically designed not to affect "substantive"
rights. See note 52 infra. It should be noted that the standard for distinguishing between
"procedure" and "substance" evolved by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and
its progeny is completely irrelevant here since there is no federal-state choice of law
issue. Indeed, the question whether a stockholder may sue on behalf of his corporation
-which the Ross Court deemed "procedural"--is "substantive" for Erie purposes. See
Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114, 116 (1957). See also Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 555-57 (1949).
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forced such rights into equity, is applicable to all legal rights asserted
in requests for traditionally equitable remedies.40
In sum, the Court's procedural impediments reasoning requires
that wherever a claim asserting legal rights was brought in equity
because the remedy sought at law was inadequate, a jury trial must
now be provided upon demand to adjudicate the underlying legal
rights. This reasoning effectively extends the right to jury trial to all
former equity actions, with the exception of those deemed to be
within the exclusive jurisdiction of equity."0 Such an extension can-
not be justified under the Seventh Amendment, which by its terms
applies only to common law actions.r1 To attempt justification of
this extension as a consequence of merger is to ignore the express
intent of Congress that the institution of uniform civil rules should
not expand the jury trial right.5
2
The procedural impediments argument reaches as far as it does
because the Court has neglected the role which procedural distinctions
played in the distribution of civil actions between law and equity.
The Seventh Amendment reflected a compromise decision to let the
existing division of cases between law and equity dictate the scope of
49. Story indicated that the concurrent jurisdiction of equity embraced more than
just situations where the remedy requested was one which the law courts traditionally did
not have the power to grant. See note 47 supra. The concurrent jurisdiction also extended
to cases where the remedy at law was inadequate in another way. Some remedies were
dispensed both by the law courts and by equity. While the remedy was therefore avail-
able on the law side of the court, other procedural limitations peculiar to the law side
rendered the remedy an incomplete form of relief failing to satisfy all the circumstances
of the particular case. To avoid these procedural limitations and gain comprchensive
relief, the plaintiff had to seek the desired remedy on. the equity side of the court. But
the procedural limitations on the ability of the court at law to perfect relief can no
longer be deemed to bar the presentation of the underlying legal issues before a jury.
For merger and the uniform Federal Rules made the more flexible equity pracices
available to the modem civil court.
50. Story characterized equity's jurisdiction as tripartite in nature, composed of three
subjurisdictions entitled the exclusive, the concurrent, and the auxiliary. J. SToRY, supra
note 46, at 116. The concurrent jurisdiction has already been explained. See note 47
supra. The exclusive jurisdiction encompassed rights and interests not recognized or
protected in law courts, such as those involving trusts. See 1 MooRE'5 FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.6[2.-2], at 216. The procedural impediments argument would appear to leave this
portion of equity unaffected because in no sense could the rights involved be deemed
"legal." Regardless of what remedy was requested, these rights could not be brought to
the law court. The auxiliary jurisdiction was exercised when equity acted in aid of an
action at law, as, for example, by way of a bill of discovery or by a creditor'es bill to
set aside fraudulent transfers. Id. The coming of merger and the institution of unified
rules has given the civil court access to these procedural aids regardless of whether the
cause of action would formerly have been characterized as legal or equitable.
51. See p. 113 supra.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970):
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall
preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution.
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the right to jury trial in civil actions.53 Yet that division itself was
based on procedural limitations self-imposed by the common law courts.
With the exception of its area of exclusive jurisdiction, equity gained
jurisdiction over an action only when law refused to accept jurisdiction
due to a procedural self-limitation regarding such matters as standing,5L
joinder of parties55 and claims50 or remedy.57 By adopting the division
of cases between law and equity as the basis for the jury right, the
Seventh Amendment gave constitutional status to these procedural
impediments, making them the touchstone of the jury right in civil
actions. The Court's suggestion in Ross that merger abolished these
procedural impediments would destroy the very basis of the law/equity
distinction and remove the foundation of the Seventh Amendment.
The procedural impediments argument which the Court employs
in Ross would, then, effectively vitiate the intent of the Seventh
Amendment merely to preserve the jury right as at common law, and
would extend that right to most of the former jurisdiction of equity.
The fact that the opinion makes no reference to the scope of that
extension may indicate that the Court was blind to the significance of
its argument. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the Court
knew precisely what it was doing and intended to lay the groundwork
for a substantial extension of the jury trial right in the future. Mr.
Justice Stewart for one, dissenting in Ross, suggested that his brethren
in the majority might have an "overpowering bias in favor of jury
trials in civil actions. ' 8
Before the Court explicitly undertakes such an extension, it should
consider certain factors with which it did not concern itself in Ross.
First, the extension is in no way dictated by the Seventh Amendment
and would represent instead a policy decision by the Court as to the
advisability of a greater use of jury trials in civil actions. Second,
the procedural impediments reasoning cannot logically be limited
short of extending the jury right to the entire concurrent jurisdiction
of equity. The categorical nature of this extension would provide a
right to jury trial for at least some cases in which a court trial might
be preferable, if only because of the complexity of the issues involved.50
53. 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PAcrcE 38.0815], at 68-76; Henderson, The Background of
the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 299 (1966).
54. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 539-43 (1970).
55. F. JAMES, supra note 10, at 455-56.
56. Id. at 446-50.
57. See note 47 supra.
58. 396 U.S. at 551 (1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
59. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TPIAL 108-45 (1950).
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Third, the breadth of the extension could significantly increase the
number of jury trials in civil actions and thereby contribute to the
growing backlog and delay in the federal district courts.00
IV.
On the civil side-not to mention the criminal side,,'-the federal
district courts are grievously overburdened. The immense and growing
backlog of cases62 is merely one indication that they are unable to cope
efficiently with the demands placed upon them. Another index is the
slow pace of justice. The median time interval0 3 from filing to dis-
position at trial of civil cases terminated during fiscal year 1970 was
17 months. For ten per cent of these cases the interval was more than
44 months.6 4 To say that the pace of justice in 'the federal district
60. Unfortunately it is not possible to quantify the potential increase since no avail-
able statistics--not even those of the Administrative Office of the Ucited States Courts
-indicate how many civil suits in the federal district courts assert legal rights and seek
equitable remedies. The statistics of the Administrative Office do break down dvil
cases in the federal district courts by "nature of suit." But it is a breakdown not useful
for purposes of this discussion. For example, the statistics indicate how many tort actions
there were in a given year, but not how many of them were brought in the form of an
injunction suit. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIREcrOR OF THE ADMMMUTI3,E OFCE
oF THE UNTD STATES COuRs, 1968, at 194-95, 208-10, 231-33 (hereinafter cited as An.m.
OFF. ANN. RP. preceded by the appropriate year]. And even it there were such statistics
from which the number of actions formerly falling within equity's concurrent jurisdiction
could be deduced, there would nevertheless be no basis for predicting in how many of
such suits a jury would actually be demanded, since there are no data indicating the
frequency with which the jury trial right is now exercised. Though precise measurement
cannot be made on the basis of available information, it would seem obvious that if
the right to jury trial extends, in light of Ross, to injunction suits, suits to compel
specific performance, suits for cancellation of a contract, and other actions that fell
within the concurrent jurisdiction of equity, there will be a substantial increase in the
number of jury trials in the federal district courts.
61. See, e.g., Chief Justice Burger, The State of the Judiciary, 56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970).
62. On the first day of fiscal 1970, i.e., July 1, 1969, there were 86,321 civil actions
pending in the district courts. During fiscal 1970, 87,321 civil actions were commenced
and 80,435 were terminated. Thus, by the end of the fiscal year the number of civil
cases pending was 93,207, an increase of 8.0% in one year. 1970 AD!. OFF. ANN. Rz. 226.
Nor was this increase very unusual. From fiscal 1965 through fiscal 1969, for example, the
number of cases pending increased each year, respectively, by the following percentages:
3.0%, 6.3%, 1.0%, 3.2%, 4.7%. 1965 Awsi. OFF. ANN. RP. 174; 1966 Amt. OFF. ANN. Rr,.
166; 1967 ADM. OFF. ANN. Rn'. 196; 1968 Atn.. OFF. ANN. RnP. 190; 1969 Am. OFF.
ANN. RP. 200.
63. It should be noted that at least insofar as judicial time figures are concerned,
medians tend to be slightly shorter than averages. Green, The Situation in 1959, 328
ANNALS 7, 11 (1960); 1959 Anri. OFF. ANN. Rn'. 101.
64. This calculation excludes land condemnation cases, habeas corpus cases, depor-
tation reviews, and motions to vacate sentence. 1970 Amst. OFF. ANN. REP. 245L The figures
for some districts are sobering indeed. In the Southern District of New York, where 395
cases reached trial (more than in any other district and 5A% of the total number of
cases reaching trial), the median time interval from filing to disposition was 35 months
and for 10% of the cases the interval was more than 61 months. Id. In the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania where 378 cases (or 5.2% of the total) reached trial, the median
interval was 41 months and for 10% of the cases the interval was 71 months. Id., 245i-
245j. Although some commentators prefer as the measure of delay the time interval
between the date when a case is "at issue' and the date when it reaches trial, see, e.g.,
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courts is too slow because half of the cases going to trial span more
than a year and five months from filing to disposition, though perhaps
a reasonable statement, relies essentially on intuition, since no absolute
standard of judicial efficiency exists. But clearly the pace is slow in a
relative sense: in 1945 the median time interval from filing to dispo-
sition at trial was 9 months; 5 by 1955 it had risen to 14.6 months;00
and by 1965 to 17 months.67
Whatever may be its merits on other grounds, the jury trial, in com-
parison with the court trial, contributes to the slow pace of justice,
and thus operates to hinder efficient judicial administration. In fiscal
1970, for example, there were 9,449 civil trials in the federal district
courts, of which 6,078 were tried to the court and 3,371 to the jury.08
The table below60 indicates the greater time required for the disposi-
tion of civil cases by jury trial:
Pctge of Pctge of
Length of Trial Jury Trials Court Trials
Less than 1 day 13.1 43.3
1 day 13.0 31.3
2 days 29.4 12.8
3 days 20.2 5.7
4 to 9 days 22.1 5.5
10 to 19 days 1.7 1.1
20 dais and longer .4 .3
Of course these figures, taken alone, may be misleading because of
possible differences between the types of cases tried to juries and
those tried to courts. The important question is how much more time
on the average would be required if a given case were tried to a jury
rather than a judge.70 Although the differential is extremely diffi-
Green, supra note 63, at 9-10, the modem view appears to be that the Interval front
filing to disposition is a more useful measure. See Preliminary Recommendations of the
Reporter, ABA COMM. ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1971).
65. 1945 ADM. OFF. ANN. REP. 91.
66. 1955 ADM. OFF. ANN. REP. 178.
67. 1965 ADM. OFF. ANN. REP. 191. Since 1965 the interval has fluctuated between 17
and 19 months. 1966 ADM. OFF. ANN. REP. 185; 1967 ADM. OFF. ANN. REP. 219; 1968
ADM. OFF. ANN. REP. 216; 1969 ADM. OFF. ANN. REP. 228.
68. 1970 ADM. OFF. ANN. REP. 255. This figure includes evidentiary trials (jury and
non-jury), hearings on temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, hear.
ings on bankruptcy review petitions, and motions in reorganization proceedings. Id,
at 257.
69. The table is based on statistical material included in 1970 ADM. OFF. ANN. REP. 255,
70. H. ZEIsE., H. KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCHHOLz, DELAY IN THE COURT 74 (1959).
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cult to calculate, 71 a leading study in the field estimates that sixty-
seven per cent more time would be needed.
72
That jury trials, on the whole, take longer than court trials is quite
understandable. Extra time is required for jury selection, voir dire,
and the charge. Opening and closing statements tend to take longer
when delivered to a jury.73 Judge and counsel must take far greater
precautions, particularly with regard to evidence, when a jury is
present, and these precautions are time-consuming. Furthermore, cer-
tain procedures, such as the motion for judgment n.o.v. and the
motion to set aside the verdict as against the weight of the evidence,
while unknown to courts trials, place additional demands upon the
time of court and counsel in jury trials.
Thus more court time is required to dispose of a case by jury trial
than by court trial. In the absence of an offsetting increase in judicial
resources,74 an increase in the number of jury trials can be expected
to reduce the overall efficiency of the courts by lowering the number
of cases that the courts can handle in a given time period. To do this
at a time when the absolute number of cases coming to trial is in-
creasing can only contribute to the growing backlog of cases and
further retard the pace of justice.
The dictates of efficient judicial administration are intimately con-
71. As Zeisel, Kalven, and Buchholz explain:
[W]e are faced with a serious difficulty. To be sure, once in a long while it hap-
pens that a case tried to a jury is reversed and then tried again, with the jury
waived. But aside from the rarity of such an event, at the second trial the case is
really not the same any more. And since it is quite unthinkable that cases could
be tried experimentally twice, it becomes clear that, even with all the time and
money for research, it would not be possible to solve the problem with precision.
Id. at 74.
72. Id. at 79. The authors based their study on the Supreme Court of New York
County. It is not improbable that their findings are roughly applicable to the federal
district courts.
73. Id. at 79.
74. There is little reason to believe that such an increase will be provided in the
foreseeable future, especially in view of the disappointing effect which appointment of
more judges has had in the past. As former Senator Joseph Tydings has observed:
The size of the Federal judiciary has almost doubled since 1940. Yet we are sinking
deeper and deeper into the quagmire of congestion and delay. And the statistics
disparage the suggestion that more judges alone are an answer to the problem.
During fiscal 1959, more than 62,000 cases were disposed of by the Federal district
courts. Two years later, in 1961, 63 additional district judgeships were created. Yet
in fiscal 1964, after virtually all of those appointments had been filled, the district
courts disposed of only 64,000 cases. Thus, with an increase of 25 per cent in ju-
dicial manpower, the courts were able to step up their productivity by only 3 per cent.
Hearings on S.915 and H.R. 6111 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements ar judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1967). No one
is quite sure why this increase in manpower has been so ineffectual. J. FRANK, AMSeUcAN
LAw: THE CASE FOR RADicAL Raroant 5-6 (1969). Antiquated administrative practices
offer at least a partial explanation. Indeed, as former Chief justice Warren has pointed
out, "adding more judges to courts using outmoded methods of administration is more
likely to retard production than it is to stimulate it." 44 ALI PnOCr CIS 1, 3 (1967).
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nected with the dictates of justice, for at some point delay in the
administration of justice becomes a denial of justice itself. Even as-
suming that in a particular case a jury may be better able than a court
to reach a "just" result,75 it does not follow that increasing the number
of jury trials will enhance the overall fairness of the civil judicial
process. The effect of the increased delay in the disposition of cases
occasioned by a significant extension of the jury right may outweigh
whatever benefits the jury may contribute to the achievement of
justice in particular cases.
V.
While the procedural impediments reasoning in Ross portends a
substantial extension of the jury right which would exacerbate the
problems of backlog and delay in the federal district courts, that
reasoning is employed in the opinion only to justify the Court's dis-
regard of the equitable nature of the shareholder's standing claim.
The Court then examines the underlying corporate claim, both as to
the rights asserted and the remedy sought, to determine whether the
jury right attaches under the Seventh Amendment.1 0 In making this
examination the Court ignores an earlier footnote in the opinion
which would appear to govern the inquiry.1 7 In that footnote, the
Court specified a tripartite "nature of the issue" test to determine the
"legal" nature of an issue and so the incidence of the jury right. This
75. No purpose would be served by here recounting the arguments for and against civil
juries. See, e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 108-45 (1950); J. FRANK, LAW AND TiE MODERIN
MIND 170-85, 302-09 (1935); H. JAMES, CRIsIs IN THE COURTS 191-205; C. JOINER, CIVIl,
JUSTICE AND TIE JURY (1962); D. KARLEN, JUDICIAL ADMINIsTRATION: TIlE AMERICAN LX-
PERIENCa 66 (1970); Kalven, The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055 (1961),
Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 Mici. L. REV. 302 (1915). As
two leading commentators on this subject point out, "Most of the unrest over the jury
today is limited to its use in civil trials. It is agreed that the case for the jury in criminal
trials is different and much stronger." H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEiSEL, TiE AMERICAN JURY
9 (1966). It is noteworthy that in England there has been a "steady decline" in the nuni,
ber of trials by jury. In 1969 the jury was used in only 2.27% of the total number of
civil actions tried in London and only 0.17% of those tried on Assize. 1969 JUDICIAl.
STATISTICS, ENGLAND AND NVALES: CIVIL JUDICIAL STATISTICS 13. Although there Is no con-
sensus on the issue of jury trial in civil actions and although the debate Is "threaded
with difficult value judgments," KALVEN AND ZEisEL, supra at 9, it would seem clear that
there are at least some-and probably many--cases in which, due to the complexity of
the issues involved, a jury is simply not as well-equipped as a judge to administer justice.
This is particularly true of cases in the commercial field, such as stockholder derivative
actions. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 545 n.5 1970) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
76. See p. 118 supra. On the facts of Ross, both the rights asserted and remedy
sought were historically legal. If Ross were confined to its facts, the resultant extension
of the jury right would not reach the whole of equity's concurrent jurisdiction. The
impact of Ross on courts' efficiency would of course be correspondingly smaller. But it
is difficult to find in the procedural impediments reasoning a logical way of confining
Ross to its facts. See note 48 supra.
77. See p. 118 supra.
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test, purporting to be merely a restatement of the traditional Seventh
Amendment historical test, is in fact a departure from it. But if given
constitutional status in subsequent opinions, it could serve as a limit
upon the reach of the procedural impediments argument in Ross.
The first criterion of the Court's tripartite test requires considera-
tion of "the pre-merger custom with reference to such questions." 8T
The Court fails, however, to specify what "questions" it means. In
Ross, for example, the Court could have viewed the stockholder
derivative suit as a unitary action, treated by pre-merger custom as
equitable in nature.70 But instead it focused on the underlying cor-
porate claim and found "pre-merger custom" to have treated that
"question" as legal.80 There is nothing in the criterion itself to prevent
the Court from considering the relevant "question" in an action
formerly within equity's concurrent jurisdiction to be the substantive
legal rights involved, while ignoring completely the equitable char-
acter of the remedy requested. Thus whether this first criterion limits
the reach of the procedural impediments argument will depend upon
how the Court subsequently defines the "question" to which pre-
merger custom is relevant.
The second criterion employed in the test is the "remedy sought." 8'
Its relevance to the- procedural impediments reasoning is that it os-
tensibly offers remedy as a limiting principle. Inclusion of the second
criterion appears to mean that an underlying claim will not be viewed
apart from, but rather in light of, the remedy it requests. Presumably,
if the remedy sought is "legal," the underlying claim will be viewed
as legal; and if the remedy sought is "equitable," the underlying claim
will be viewed as equitable. The application of this criterion would
thus seem to prevent extension of the jury trial right to all cases tra-
ditionally within the concurrent jurisdiction of equity, since within
this jurisdiction the remedies sought were "equitable." 2
But, for at least three reasons, the inclusion of remedy sought as part
of the Court's test offers no guarantee that the jury right will not be
extended to the concurrent jurisdiction of equity. As previously
indicated the procedural impediments argument reaches both obsta-
cles to standing, as held in Ross, and limitations upon the remedial
78. See p. 118 supra.
79. See pp. 115-16 supra.
80. See pp. 116-18 supra.
81. See p. 118 supra.
82. See pp. 119-20 supra. The second criterion would not, however, prccludc the
extension of the jury right involved in Ross itself. See note 76 supra.
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power of the court while sitting at law."" Both are limitations on the
presentation of legal issues before juries, "procedural impediments"
deemed abolished by merger. To distinguish between them, and
continue to give effect to remedy limitations as a bar to jury trial of
legal issues while denying such effect to standing restraints, is to make
an arbitrary distinction unsupported by, and indeed incompatible
with, the logic of the procedural impediments argument. Secondly,
the determination of what is or is not an equitable or legal remedy
can be made validly only by reference to history, since the distinction
between law and equity is solely historical in origin.8 4 Yet the Court
has shown itself quite prepared to ignore the historical classification
of remedies as legal or equitable. In Dairy Queen the Court disregard-
ed the traditional characterization of an accounting as an equitable
remedy, and treated it rather as a legal claim for money damages.8
Once history is disregarded in this fashion, the purported distinction
between legal and equitable remedies becomes a cover for unpre-
dictable discretion, with courts left free to classify remedies as they
see fit. Finally, in light of the fact that Ross's tripartite test offers
no indication as to how its three criteria are to be weighted and
applied, the criterion of remedy sought may simply be ignored without
violating the test. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit, relying on Ross, has
already ignored remedy for purposes of determining whether an under-
lying claim was to be accorded a jury trial.80
The third criterion of the Ross test, the "practical abilities and limi-
tations of juries,"87 might also serve to limit the extension of the jury
right suggested by the procedural impediments argument. Its opera-
tion can be seen best by examining the way the Court could have used
this criterion in Katchen v. Landys8 to deny the jury trial right in
a clearly legal action. In that case, a bankruptcy trustee asserted and
proved voidable preferences in response to a claim filed by the creditor
who received the preferences. The issue before the Court was whether
the bankruptcy court had summary jurisdiction to order the surrender
of the preferences without a jury trial, or whether in order to preserve
83. See pp. 118-21 supra.
84. See pp. 121-22 supra.
85. 369 U.S. at 477-79 (1962).
86. Bruce v. Bohanon, 436 F.2d 733 (10th Cir. 1970). Plaintiff sought inter alia relief
in the form of an accounting. Assuming the remedy sought to be equitable, the court
nevertheless declared that "we must look beyond the relief sought and determine the
true nature of the underlying claim upon which the prayer for relief is itself predicated."
Id. at 786. The court concluded that the underlying claim was legal because it sounded
in tort and that therefore the jury right attached. Id.
87. See p. 118 supra.
88. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
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the creditor's jury right the court was required to stay its own pro-
ceedings and instruct the bankruptcy trustee to recover the preferences
by instituting a plenary suit, in which a jury trial would be available
to the creditor. While expressly recognizing that an action to recover
a voidable preference is essentially a legal claim for debt, the Court
held that the issue could be tried by the bankruptcy court without a
jury.89 The reason offered for this result was that to require a plenary
recovery action would be to dismember "a specific statutory scheme
contemplating the prompt trial of a disputed claim without the inter-
vention of a jury."910
Under either the traditional historical test or the first two criteria
of the Ross test, the recovery action would have been found legal in
nature and a jury right accorded. Neither test would have provided
any justification for the Court's disregarding this result in the interest
of a congressional scheme for prompt disposition of certain kinds of
claims. Yet the third criterion of the Ross test, injecting considerations
of the practical limitations of juries, could provide a constitutional
basis for the Court's deference to the congressional scheme. Similarly,
this criterion might serve as a rationale for limiting an extension of
the jury right under the procedural impediments reasoning if that
extension were in conflict with a congressional preference for a court
trial, expressed in a statutory scheme precluding jury trials. In addi-
tion, criterion three would permit a court to deny a jury request if
an action were thought to be too complex for a jury, even though the
procedural impediments argument might require a contrary result.
But this third criterion at best affords an uncertain limit upon the
reach of the procedural impediments argument. In the first place, it
is unclear whether the criterion would be applied to situations where
Congress has withdrawn a certain kind of case from disposition by
jury trial much less to cases where the issues appear to be too complex
for civil juries. Secondly, the Court's opinion, by failing to indicate how
the three criteria in the Ross test are to be weighted and applied,
would permit the third criterion to be ignored. In fact this appears to
have occurred in Ross itself, for in analyzing the "nature of the issue"
presented by the underlying corporate claim the Court makes no ref-
erence to the competence of juries to handle such claims.9' This failure
to employ the third criterion in the actual determination of the jury
right in Ross is significant, since the Court rested its opinion squarely
89. Id. at 335-38.
90. Id. at 339.
91. See p. 118 supra.
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on the Seventh Amendment.92 Employing the third criterion in this
determination would thus have given it constitutional status. Yet the
considerations reflected in the third criterion have never been a part
of the historical Seventh Amendment test. The jury right preserved
by that amendment was the right that historically existed at English
common law in 1791. 93 The fact that under English practice a par-
ticular kind of action was within the jurisdiction of the common law
courts, as opposed to the equity courts, and thus generally was accord-
ed the jury right was not the product of a rational judgment as to
the "practical abilities and limitations of juries."0' 4 Rather it was
largely a product of the power struggle between the equity chancellor
and the common law courts.05 The distribution was rarely "rational"
in the sense of actions being assigned according to their relative
amenability to decision by juries as opposed to judges.00 The failure
of the Court in Ross to employ the third criterion in its determination
that the Seventh Amendment extended to the derivative action,
coupled with the fact that historically the Seventh Amendment has
not been viewed as embracing the considerations reflected in the
criterion, raises some question as to whether the criterion can be
accorded constitutional status and used to limit the reach of the
procedural impediments argument.
VI.
Should the Court desire to limit the extension of the jury right
which appears to be mandated by the procedural impediments argu-
ment, the criteria of the tripartite test could be employed as limiting
principles. The first two criteria can be read to approximate the tra-
ditional Seventh Amendment test and contain the jury right largely
within its current limits. 7 And if the Court should still desire incre-
mentally to extend the jury right to those kinds of cases where jury
trial can improve the fact-finding capability of the judicial process,
it could justify its extension by employing the third criterion. Before
making such an extension, however, the Court should balance the
benefits to be anticipated against the potential harm to the efficient
dispensation of justice in the federal courts.0 8
92. 396 U.S. at 542 (1970).
93. See p. 113 supra.
94. 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAnccE 38.11[9], at 128.21.
95. F. JAMES, supra note 10, at 346.
96. Id. at 344-46.
97. See p. 127 supra. This would not, however, preclude the extension already ac.
complished by the holding in Ross. See note 76 supra.
98. The benefits side of this balance may be difficult to determine. Not only Is
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To use this approach, the Court would have to constitutionalize
its tripartite Ross test and in particular its final criterion. The Court
would thereby inject new considerations into the Seventh Amendment,
contrary to the long-standing interpretation of the amendment as
having embodied only historical distinctions.0  Thus an act of judicial
legislation would be required.
This situation could be avoided by the Court's adoption of a non-
constitutional means to extend the jury right. An example of the
non-constitutional approach can be found in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative, Inc. 00
Byrd was a negligence action brought in federal district court, with
jurisdiction founded on diversity of citizenship. One of the affirmative
defenses raised was that under South Carolina's workmen's compen-
sation act plaintiff was defendant's employee and was therefore barred
from suing him because plaintiff was obliged to accept statutory com-
pensation benefits as the exclusive remedy for his injuries. One of the
questions before the Court was whether on remand the factual issues
raised by this defense were to be decided by the judge or by the jury.
The policy of the South Carolina courts was that such issues were for
the judge.1
01
The Court held that for purposes of applying the doctrine of Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins'02 the state rule was one "of form and mode."'0 3
But it acknowledged that the cases following Erie evinced the broader
policy that federal courts should conform as nearly as possible to state
rules even of form and mode when the non-application of the state
rule would affect the outcome of the litigation and conceded that in
the instant case the outcome might be "substantially affected by
whether the issue... is decided by a judge or a jury."'u0
The Court nevertheless held that the issue must be tried to the
jury because of "affirmative countervailing considerations."' 03 As Mr.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, put it,
[a]n essential characteristic [of the federal judicial system] is the
manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial
there no scientific way to ascertain which issues are best suited for which mode of trial,
but also there is no general agreement even on the basic premises that should underlie
an evaluation of the suitability of issues for a given mode of trial. Professor James terms
these difficulties "quite insurmountable." F. JAMEs, supra note 10, at 378.
99. See p. 113 supra.
100. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
101. Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 230 S.C. 532, 96 S.E.2d 566 (1957).
102. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
103. 356 US. at 536 (1958).
104. Id. at 536-37.
105. Id. at 537.
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functions between judge and jury and, under the influence-if
not the command-of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the de-
cisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury. The policy of
uniform enforcement of state-created rights and obligations . . .
cannot in every case exact compliance with a state rule ... which
disrupts the federal system of allocating functions between judge
and jury ....
We think that in the circumstances of this case the federal
court should not follow the state rule.100
Thus the Court extended the jury right to the issue of the employment
status of the plaintiff in the face of a contrary state practice which,
under normal Erie principles, would govern. Justice Brennan scrupu-
lously avoided resting this holding on the Seventh Amendment. 107
Instead, the Byrd decision gives effect to the interest of the federal
system in allocating the functions between judge and jury in accord-
ance with its own conception of the sound administration of justice.108
Thus Byrd would serve as precedent for the extension of the jury
right where the contributions of the jury to the fact-finding process
were deemed to advance the sound administration of justice. The
main advantage of using this non-constitutional approach is its ready
availability. To employ a constitutional approach under the Ross
tripartite test, the Court would have to read its final criterion into
the Seventh Amendment. Byrd offers the Court a means of avoiding
such explicit judicial legislation. In addition, this approach offers
106. Id. at 537-38 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 537 n.10.
108. A similar non-constitutional approach was employed in Fitzgerald, Public Ad-
ministrator v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963). There plaintiff, a seaman,
claimed damages for injuries sustained while working on defendant's ship. Plaintiff
brought a negligence claim against defendant under the Jones Act, which provides
plaintiffs a jury trial as of right. Joined with the negligence issue were unseaworthiness
and maintenance and cure claims, traditional admiralty claims which in the absence of
a statute do not ordinarily require trial by jury. Plaintiff nevertheless demanded a jury
trial of all the claims in his complaint. Without resorting to the Seventh Amendment
the Court held that "a maintenance and cure claim joined with a Jones Act claim must
be submitted to the jury when both arise out of one set of facts." Id. at 21. The Court's
reasoning was firmly based on considerations of sound judicial administration. Mr.
Justice Black, writing for the Court, reasoned that to require a plaintiff to submit part
of his lawsuit to a judge and part to a jury complicates the trial, creates difficulties In
applying collateral estoppel and res judicata, and can easily result in excessive or in.
adequate recovery. Id. at 18-20. The Court reasoned that although the Seventh Amend-
ment does not require jury trials in admiralty cases, there is no basis either in the
Constitution or the Amendments to forbid them. Recognizing the Court's own responsi.
bility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law, Justice Black wrote:
Where as here, a particular mode of trial being used by many judges is so cumber.
some, confusing, and time consuming that it places completely unnecessary obstacles
in the paths of litigants seeking justice in our courts, we should not and do not
hesitate to take action to correct the situation.
Id. at 21.
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greater flexibility. Since the standard is sound judicial administra-
tion, the Court may with relative ease contract an extension of tie
jury right should juries prove incapable of dealing with the particular
kind of case in question or should the courts become so overburdened
as a consequence of jury right extensions as to be unable to meet even
present standards of judicial efficiency. By rooting such extensions in
the Seventh Amendment, the Court in effect would grant subsequent
litigants a constitutional right to a jury trial in cases to which its
extensions apply. The Court can be expected to be unwilling to re-
trench on a constitutional right in the name of considerations of mere
administrative efficiency should juries prove inept or courts become
overloaded. Although it cannot be pretended that constitutional rights
can never be abrogated or circumscribed, nor that rights extended on a
non-constitutional basis can be retracted with complete ease, it should
be dear that the non-constitutional approach does afford a relatively
greater degree of flexibility.
If the inclusion of the third criterion in the Ross test indicates a
desire on the part of the Court to expand the jury trial right in keep-
ing with pragmatic considerations of juries' competence, the Court
should employ the non-constitutional approach introduced in Byrd
to make such extensions. This approach avoids the judicial legislation
that would be required to read efficiency considerations into the
Seventh Amendment and in addition leaves the Court free to retract
its extensions of the jury trial right should their effect on the judicial
process prove to be adverse.
